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JUST WAR THEORY: REVISIONISTS VS. TRADITIONALISTS 
1. Traditionalists and Revisionists 
Since the publication of Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, in 1977, a ‘traditionalist’ 
stance has dominated thinking about the morality of war in universities, military 
academies, and international legal circles. Its central commitment is to provide moral 
foundations for international law as it applies to armed conflict: states (and only states) 
may go to war only for national defence, defence of other states, or to intervene to avert 
‘crimes that shock the moral conscience of mankind’ (Walzer [2006b: 107]). Civilians may 
not be targeted in war, but all combatants, whatever they are fighting for, are morally 
permitted to target one another, even when doing so foreseeably harms some civilians (as 
long as it does not do so excessively). 
Over the last two decades, this traditionalist theory of just war has been subjected to 
exacting scrutiny, as for the first time sustained analytical attention has been brought to 
bear on the ethics of war. Analytical philosophers have overturned almost all the 
traditionalist conclusions: its continued popularity outside philosophy departments is now 
matched by its contentiousness within them. Many of these sceptics are ‘revisionists’. They 
have: challenged the permissibility of national defence, and the moral standing of states 
more generally; argued for expanded permissions for military intervention; questioned 
civilian immunity; and argued that combatants fighting for wrongful aims cannot do 
anything right, besides lay down their weapons.  
This paper is about the revisionist critique of traditionalist just war theory, and the 
traditionalist response. I begin with some methodological notes, before turning to the 
ethical evaluation of first wars as a whole, then of individual actions within war. 
2. The Methodology of Just War Theory 
In this section I identify some methodological disputes that underpin the substantive 
debate between revisionists and institutionalists. For each dispute I note that, though 
revisionists typically fall on one side and traditionalists on the other, this need not be the 
case. And for each I indicate which side presently has the better of the argument. 
The first split is between philosophers who make institutions their focus and those who 
concentrate on acts. Institutionalists tend either to look to the long-term effects of the laws 
of war (Mavrodes [1975]; Dill and Shue [2012]; Shue [2013]; Waldron [2016]), or to see them 
as the basis of an actual or hypothetical contract between either states or their citizens  
(Benbaji [2008, 2011, 2014]; Statman [2014]). Non-institutionalists think that acts can be right 
or wrong independent of how they relate to existing institutions. They typically focus on 
the individual rights that the act threatens, and on its consequences (as contrasted with the 
long-run consequences of an institutional rule). 
Traditionalists are often institutionalists. Revisionists less often so. As we will see 
below, it is hard to see how some acts permitted by the laws of war could be non-
institutionally justified. This is most obviously true for harms inflicted in the pursuit of an 
unjust cause. But one can advance non-institutionalist arguments for traditionalist 
conclusions (e.g. Lazar [2015]). And one could defend revisionism on institutionalist 
grounds—for example, Cheyney Ryan [2016] advocates pacifism in virtue of moral 
criticism of the military–industrial complex. 
Most revisionists, however, are moral revisionists only. They reject traditionalists’ 
attempts to morally vindicate the laws of armed conflict. But they agree with traditionalists 
that we could not secure widespread agreement on any more restrictive changes to the 
laws of war, and any attempts to change them would undermine their authority, with 
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disastrous results.1 Imagine you lived in a society in which physical assault was so 
widespread that the only way to limit the number of fatalities was to legally permit any 
assault that did not rise to the level of murder. Imagine that enough people benefit thereby 
that it would be impossible to change the law to prohibit assault. Indeed, any attempts to 
do so would undermine the authority of the law, leading to an increase in murder rates. In 
such a society, we might well agree that the existing law should be retained, since it is the 
best we can do, and at least reduces the amount of wrongful death. But would that settle 
the question of whether you should commit an assault? Clearly it would not.  
So, even if traditionalists and revisionists reluctantly agree about preserving the 
existing laws of war, important questions remain to be settled. Do those laws reflect our 
moral reasons? Or do they do no more than set minimum standards that we should, in our 
own conduct, seek to rise above?  
 
The next divide is more in-house. Most contemporary moral and political philosophers use 
something like Rawls’s method of seeking reflective equilibrium. On this approach, we 
develop moral arguments by taking our considered judgements about the permissibility of 
action in particular cases, and trying to identify the underlying principles that unify them. 
We then take those principles and test their application to other cases. If the principles 
generate conclusions that conflict with our considered judgements about those cases, then 
we must revise either the principles or our judgements. As our project evolves, and we 
revise our principles in light of our judgements, and our judgements in light of our 
principles, we approach reflective equilibrium. 
What kinds of cases should test our principles in the ethics of war? We can think 
realistic scenarios, paying attention to international affairs and military history. Or, more 
clinically, we can construct hypothetical cases to isolate variables and test their 
independent impact on our judgements. Revisionists often use very abstract cases (e.g. 
McMahan [1994]; Rodin [2002]). Traditionalists take them to task for this, lamenting their 
tone-deaf ignorance of the realities of war (Walzer [2006b]; Dill and Shue [2012]). Some 
philosophers buck these trends—there are revisionists who draw deeply on military 
history (e.g. Fabre [2012]) and traditionalists who use far-fetched hypotheticals (Lazar 
[2013]).  
Abstraction has some advantages. It avoids awkward disputes over historical details and 
background political assumptions. Discussing the principle of proportionality by thinking 
about, say, the NATO campaign in Kosovo might well invite serious debate over how many 
civilians were actually killed in the campaign. Any examples involving Israel or Gaza are 
likely to inflame political passions.  
But abstraction also has costs. Our intuitions about far-fetched cases might be 
unreliable. It is perhaps morally dubious to invoke sanitised hypothetical examples when 
we could instead draw on the harrowing experience of real victims of war. And in 
abstracting away from the distinctive nature of war, we often lose morally relevant 
information. Philosophers’ cases usually presuppose omniscience, for example, rather than 
condescending to the radical uncertainty that bedevils all decisions about and within war. 
They make no concessions for fear or trauma, and underemphasise crucial aspects of the 
phenomenology of war, such as combatants’ attachments to their comrades-in-arms. 
We should avoid dogmatism: many different approaches can illuminate the morality of 
war. But I think that highly artificial hypotheticals should be used carefully, ensuring that 
                                                        
1 On the relationship between the morality of war and the law of war, see the broadly traditionalist arguments 
of Henry Shue and Seth Lazar, the morally but not legally revisionist arguments of Jeff McMahan, and the 
morally and legally revisionist arguments of David Rodin. McMahan [2008]; Shue [2008]; McMahan [2010a]; 
Shue [2010]; Rodin [2011]; Lazar [2012a]; Shue [2013]. For a book-length treatment of the topic, see Haque 
[Forthcoming]. 
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any conclusions they support are tenable when applied to the messy reality of war; and 
that one’s intuitive judgements are the starting-point for investigation, rather than its end.  
 
One reason for the preponderance of highly abstract hypotheticals in recent just war 
theory is that many revisionists are reductivists, since they think that all justified killing, in 
war or outside of it, is justified at root by precisely the same properties. In their most 
extreme moments, they argue that wars are justified if and only if they are composed 
exclusively of justified acts of individual self- and other-defence (Rodin [2002]; McMahan 
[2004]). Non-reductivists think, in a nutshell, that there is something different about killing 
in war. Wars have some distinctive properties that are relevant to the morality of killing. 
Typical examples include the sheer scale of the fighting, the widespread indifference to 
moral constraints that war often involves, the political and territorial goods at stake, the 
‘fog of war’, the existence of institutions such as international law, and the fact that the 
conflict is fought by organised groups.  
Here, as before, we can advance non-reductivist arguments for revisionist conclusions 
(Bazargan [2013]), and reductivist arguments for traditionalism (Steinhoff [2008]; Lazar 
[2015]). But the predominant dialectic has been the other way. I cannot settle this debate 
here. Reductivist considerations are crucially important: people have fundamental rights to 
life and liberty that they don’t simply lose once they enter a state of war. But it is oddly 
dogmatic to confine our normative palette to these reasons alone. The laws of war matter 
morally. The institutions at stake matter morally. The collective character of military action 
matters. An exclusively reductivist account of the morality of war would be incomplete. 
 
Just war theorists further divide in their attitudes to the apparently collective nature of 
warfare. Some are all-out individualists: they think that only individuals act in war, not 
collectives (they are descriptive individualists). And they think that only individuals matter in 
war (they are evaluative individualists).2 By contrast, Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars was 
evaluatively collectivist—pointing to something transcendental about the survival of 
political communities to justify intentionally attacking civilians in ‘supreme emergencies’, 
for example (Walzer [2006b: 247]). Its implicit descriptive collectivism was made explicit in 
Walzer’s later work (Walzer [2006a]). His first critics argued that applying a thoroughgoing 
descriptive and evaluative individualism to war entailed revisionist conclusions (Luban 
[1980b]; McMahan [1994]; Rodin [2002]). Many philosophers then sought to defend 
traditionalism by rejecting either descriptive (Kutz [2005]; Walzer [2006b]; Lazar [2012b]) or 
evaluative individualism (Zohar [1993]). Again, of course some individualists defend 
traditionalism (Emerton and Handfield [2009]). And some collectivists are revisionists 
(Bazargan [2013]).  
Of all the divides that separate (most) traditionalists from (most) revisionists, this one is 
potentially the most consequential, while being the hardest to settle. War can provide 
useful test cases for thinking about collective action and the value of collectives; but we 
really need to develop our theory of collective action and value first, then apply it to war. 
My view on this question, then, is even more provisional than my verdict on the other 
disputes. I think that collectives can be valuable independently of how they contribute to 
their members’ well-being, for the prosaic reason that not only individual well-being has 
value. Groups can instantiate other goods—justice or solidarity, for example (Temkin 
[1993]). I am not, ultimately, sure whether descriptive collectivism is true. It may be possible 
to reduce any putatively collective act to the acts of the collective’s members. But doing so 
is often alarmingly circuitous, and does not, I think, alter the moral stakes. Some normative 
constraints apply primarily to what we do together, and continue to do so regardless of 
                                                        
2 Two useful starting points for considering evaluative and descriptive collectivism respectively: Taylor [1995]; 
List and Pettit [2011].  
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how we decompose our group acts into individual acts. For example, when fighting a war 
we must ensure that the overall harm that we inflict, together, is kept to the minimum 
feasible (Lazar [2012b]). 
 
The archetypal traditionalist, then, is a non-reductivist collectivist, who uses realistic cases. 
The archetypal revisionist is an individualist reductivist, who uses cases involving meteors 
and mind-control. Simplifying a little, we might unify the former positions under the 
heading of political philosophy approaches to just war theory and group the latter together 
as moral philosophy approaches. There are, of course, political arguments for revisionism, 
and moral arguments for traditionalism. But we can diagnose much of the recent success of 
revisionist just war theory as having its roots in the preponderance of moral philosophers 
in the field. 
3. Jus ad Bellum   
Just war theorists have traditionally divided their enquiry into thinking about the resort to 
war—jus ad bellum—and conduct in war—jus in bello. My approach is an extension of this. 
The jus ad bellum concerns the morality of the war as a whole. This obviously governs 
permissible resort. But it also determines whether the war can permissibly be continued. 
Jus in bello concerns the morality of particular actions within war. I address jus ad bellum 
first, then jus in bello.  
 
The great suffering and destruction wrought by war can be justified only if fighting serves 
some great end. Just war theorists typically argue that going to war is impermissible unless 
it is aimed at a ‘just cause’. And the cataclysm of war is so severe that the list of candidate 
just causes is short. Traditionalist just war theory recognises only two: national defence (of 
one’s own state or an ally’s) and humanitarian intervention to avert the very gravest mass 
atrocities. Importantly, the right of national defence is assumed to apply to most actual 
states with all their flaws, not solely to (for example) ideal liberal democracies. Only states 
actively engaged in the kind of mass atrocities that can warrant humanitarian intervention 
lack rights of national defence. 
Walzer offered three arguments to justify states’ rights to national defence (Walzer 
[2006b: 58]). First, states protect their citizens’ basic human rights to life and liberty. 
Second, they protect a common cultural life made by their citizens over time. Third, they 
are the objects of a kind of organic social contract, through which people have given up 
particular freedoms for the sake of a better outcome for all. Walzer construes this, too, as 
the object of a basic human right.3 
These arguments for sovereignty are double-edged. They help justify wars of national 
defence, but also raise the bar for justifying humanitarian intervention. Intervening 
militarily in the affairs of another state obviously threatens its political sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Hence Walzer wanted to tightly constrain military interventions in 
other states. They could be permitted, he argued, only to avert the very gravest of crimes. 
Revisionists lacerated Walzer’s arguments for traditionalist positions on national 
defence and humanitarian intervention. They highlighted and challenged his implicit 
evaluative collectivism (Doppelt [1978]; Beitz [1980]; Luban [1980a]), noting that, far from 
protecting individual rights, states are often the pre-eminent threat to those rights. They 
also argued that the prosperity of the ‘common life’ often means oppression for cultural 
minorities (Caney [2005]). Even setting this point aside, is the common life of a state really 
threatened by war? And is it really worth killing for? They were equally sceptical about the 
                                                        
3 Walzer focused on the importance of political sovereignty, but said little about territorial rights; to date little 
has been written about the role of territory in just cause (though see Stilz [2014]). 
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organic social contract idea—is it much more than a metaphor (Wasserstrom [1978]; Luban 
[1980b])? David Rodin (Rodin [2002]), in particular, developed a comprehensive account of 
how the traditionalist stance on when states may go to war in national defence could not be 
grounded in the defence of individual rights.  
By undermining states’ rights to national defence, revisionists also made humanitarian 
intervention easier to justify. Sometimes these arguments were directly linked: if states 
cannot protect their citizens’ security, they lack the rights to sovereignty which military 
intervention might otherwise undermine (Shue [1997]). Caney [2005] concludes that 
military intervention is permissible just in case it improves the net satisfaction of basic 
human rights. Others defend, at least in principle, ‘redistributive’ wars, fought against the 
global rich to redress the suffering of the global poor (Luban [1980b]; Fabre [2012]; Lippert-
Rasmussen [2013]; Øverland [2013]).  
Revisionists exposed the holes in Walzer’s traditionalist arguments, but many 
philosophers have been reluctant to endorse the radical implications of their critique. In 
particular, if states’ rights to national defence are grounded in individual rights, then 
national defence will be impermissible against ‘lesser aggressors’—those who wage war for 
purely political and territorial reasons, who will threaten life and liberty only if their target 
state uses lethal force against them (think, for example, of the US and their allies invading 
Iraq, or of the Falklands/Malvinas war). Moreover, if military intervention is permissible 
whenever it will secure a net gain in human rights satisfaction, then states will lack rights of 
national defence against, for example, wars to spread democracy and other good liberal 
institutions. Indeed, on the individualist view it is hard to see how any state short of an 
ideal Rawlsian liberal democracy would have rights of national defence (Kutz [2014]). We 
have, then, two options: either endorse these radical implications or seek out alternative 
foundations for familiar rights of national defence (Emerton and Handfield [2014]).  
Some revisionists have argued that the defence of individual rights is sufficient to justify 
ordinary rights of national defence. They emphasise the importance of deterrence and the 
impossibility of knowing, in cases of lesser aggression, whether it will remain bloodless 
(Fabre [2014]). Others think that we must take people’s political interests into account when 
justifying war. People have an interest in having at least a home-grown, if not a 
democratically elected government. Perhaps these interests are not important enough for 
their defence to justify killing in isolated cases. But when enough people are threatened, 
perhaps the total interests at stake can justify the death and destruction of war (Hurka 
[2007]; Frowe [2014]).  
These arguments in favour of national defence also limit the scope of humanitarian 
intervention. We can justify further limits if we recall the very limited conditions in which 
military intervention can succeed—for example, stopping an ongoing atrocity is 
considerably easier than improving a state’s political institutions. Perhaps redistributive 
wars could, in principle, be justified. But since any attempt to rescue the global poor by 
using force against the rich would obviously make lives worse for the very people it aims to 
help, it is a moral non-starter. That said, resource wars might become more practically 
salient in our more radically straitened future. 
So Walzer’s defence of traditionalist positions came up short; but revisionists’ early 
radicalism has since been much reined in. The most pressing challenge that remains, in my 
view, is to give a richer account of people’s political and territorial interests, to explain just 
why we have an interest in being subject to home-grown government, even if it is not 
democratic; and why it matters to the average Turkish citizen, for example, that Russian 
aircraft remain outside their airspace. In each case, we must explain why these interests are 
important enough to be worth killing for. 
 
International law is written by and for states. Unsurprisingly, it has a statist bias. Only 
states have rights of national defence. It is much harder for non-state actors to acquire, for 
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example, the rights to kill and to prisoner of war status than it is for the uniformed 
members of a state’s armed forces. Together, these positions reflect a long-standing 
commitment in the just war tradition to the principle of ‘legitimate authority’, according to 
which only sovereigns have the right to go to war.  
Revisionists have argued that if war is justified by the protection of individual rights, 
then why should only sovereigns/governments be allowed to kill defensively? We are not 
obliged to await institutional support when using necessary lethal force in ordinary cases 
of self- and other-defence. So we should either disregard the requirement of legitimate 
authority or see it as something that non-state actors can, in fact, fulfil (Fabre [2008]; Finlay 
[2010]; Schwenkenbecher [2013]). 
Revisionists are, I think, right about defence of life and liberty. We are self-authorising 
when those rights are at stake. But not all justified wars involve defending life and liberty 
alone. As we saw above, we cannot sustain ordinary rights of national defence without 
appealing to people’s political interests in having a representative government. But these 
very interests are set back when states go to war without authorisation from their polity (). 
So a modicum of statism is appropriate: states are better able to secure the authorisation of 
their people before going to war (either by explicit vote or by a standing constitutional 
licence). Having this authorisation makes it easier to justify the state’s going to war. Non-
state actors, and non-democratic states, fare worse on this score than do democratic states.  
With legitimate authority as with just cause, revisionists have shown the flaws of 
existing arguments for traditionalist conclusions. But, again, the right response is not to 
jettison those conclusions, but to seek better arguments. Perhaps legitimate authority as it 
was conceived in historical just war theory is unimportant; undoubtedly the statism of 
international law is overdone. But when a subset of a group fights on behalf of the group as 
a whole, then it clearly matters that they be authorised to do so. States, especially 
democratic states, are better able to secure that authorisation than non-state actors.  
 
The other key conditions of historical just war theory are right intention, reasonable 
prospects of success, imminent threat, proportionality and necessity. Right intention now 
receives almost no attention—for good reason: it pertains to an age when princes rather 
than governments went to war, and just war theory’s primary concern was to guide the 
princes’ confessors. Revisionist just war theory has advanced our understanding of the 
other four conditions in two ways. First, it has undermined the canonical view that each of 
them is a necessary condition for ad bellum justice. In fact, only proportionality and 
necessity are truly necessary. Wars can be ad bellum just even if they lack reasonable 
prospects of success, and even if the threat that they seek to avert is not imminent. Second, 
and relatedly, they are not really distinct conditions for justification (Hurka [2005, 2007]; 
McMahan [2016]). Reasonable prospects of success and imminence are staging-posts on the 
way to judgements of proportionality and necessity.  
The necessity constraint prohibits the unnecessary infliction of harm (here I draw on 
Lazar [2012b]). Harm is almost always bad (the exception may be where it is deserved), so 
can be permissible only if it enables us to realise some countervailing good or avert some 
evil. If you could achieve the same good (or avert the same evil) by inflicting less harm, 
then the surplus harm is unnecessary, and so unjustified. Obviously, in actual wars, we 
cannot know how much harm we will inflict or, indeed, how much good fighting will do. 
We must therefore factor this uncertainty into our calculations of necessity. The simplest 
way to do this is to discount possible outcomes by their probability of occurring, so that 
you can weigh the expected harm inflicted against the expected good done. If you have two 
alternatives, A and B, and A will realise the same expected good as B, but inflict less 
expected harm, then B involves unnecessary expected harm and so is impermissible. If the 
expected harm from A is less than B, but so is the expected good, then we need to decide 
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whether the reduction in expected harm is morally important enough to require you to 
bear that much additional risk to the pursuit of your objective. If it is, then B involves 
inflicting unnecessary expected harm.  
Proportionality and necessity are superficially distinct. A war might be necessary, since 
there is no other means to achieve its end, and yet disproportionate, because the end is not 
valuable enough to justify the means. To work out proportionality, we need to ask whether 
the evil inflicted is great enough to justify the evil averted. This means comparing going to 
war with what would happen if we allowed the threat to eventuate. That comparison is 
substantively identical to the comparisons between different means for achieving one’s 
ends involved in applying the necessity constraint. Applying the necessity constraint 
means comparing all your options that have some prospect of averting the threat, to ensure 
that the chosen one does not involve inflicting unnecessary harm. Applying the 
proportionality constraint means comparing your best military option with what would 
happen if you did not avert the threat. Both could be subsumed into a broader criterion, 
which simply compares all your options in this way. 
If a war lacks adequate prospects of success, then it is unlikely to be proportionate. 
Going to war involves inflicting great evils. If it is unlikely to achieve any good, then it is 
most likely ruled out. But this is a defeasible presumption: the costs of defeat might be 
great enough that even a very small chance of success is enough to make fighting 
proportionate.  
If the threat is not imminent, then there are probably less harmful means to safety than 
the resort to war. Again, this presumption is defeasible. Sometimes delay will make defeat 
much more likely. Hence Walzer argued for the permissibility of pre-emptive attacks, such 
as Israel’s in the Six Day War (Walzer [2006b: 80]). It is much harder to justify ‘preventive’ 
wars, fought to avert a threat that is further in the future: the more distant the threat, the 
more likely it is that it can be neutralised by some means other than fighting. In practice, 
retaining the imminence requirement is a sensible way to minimise abuses by states 
looking for excuses to go to war (Buchanan and Keohane [2004]). But this is a pragmatic 
concession to predictably wrongful state practice, rather than a deliverance of moral 
theory. 
To work out proportionality and necessity, we need to ask what matters in war, and how 
it matters. What are the salient goods and bads? Obviously the goods involved in the just 
cause—the protection of life and liberty, and people’s political interests—are vital. And the 
most obvious bads are the death and destruction to which fighting will inevitably lead. 
Crucially, we need to consider all the goods and bads that will arise because of the war—
including those that will follow the active phase of the conflict. Recent misadventures by 
the US and its allies in the Middle East underscore how central to a war’s justification is the 
realisation of a worthy peace when the fighting is done (Bass [2004]; Coady [2008]; May 
[2012]).  
Knowing the goods and bads realised by war is not enough. We also need to know how 
to weigh them. The simplest approach would be to weigh all lives, for example, equally. 
But this is not plausible. Lives matter in two ways. First, because they add value to the 
world. Second, because they are protected by rights (Lazar [2015]). Ending a life is (almost) 
always bad. But it only sometimes amounts to a rights-violation. And right-violating killing 
is much harder to justify than its counterpart. Walzer argued that all soldiers lose their 
right to life (Walzer [2006b: REF]); many revisionists have replied that, even if this is true 
for those fighting for unjust ends, it is false for just combatants. But everybody thinks that 
some soldiers are unprotected by rights to life. And that clearly matters to the 
proportionality of the war.  
We need also to consider our own standing in relation to lives taken. Many think that, 
when working out proportionality and necessity, deaths inflicted by the enemy side in a 
war should not count equally with the deaths we impose (though see Rodin [2014]). Some 
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think this is because we have stronger obligations not to do harm than we have to prevent 
harms done by others (e.g. McMahan [2010b]). We might also think that the lives of those 
with whom we share special relationships should bear greater weight in our 
deliberations—this seems relatively obvious at the small scale, where deep personal 
relationships are concerned. But it also seems plausible when weighing the lives of 
comrades-in-arms and of compatriots (Kamm [2004]; Hurka [2005]; Lazar [2013]). 
4. Jus in Bello 
Underpinning the law of armed conflict are three fundamental principles:  
Discrimination: Intentionally attacking noncombatants is impermissible.4 
Proportionality: Unintentionally harming noncombatants is permissible 
only if the harms are proportionate to the goals the attack is intended to 
achieve.5 
Necessity: Unintentionally harming noncombatants is permissible only if 
the least harmful means feasible are chosen.6 
These principles presuppose that the victims of war fall into two classes—combatants and 
noncombatants. Combatants may be killed almost without constraint.7 Noncombatants 
enjoy substantial protections. Combatants are members of the armed forces of a group at 
war, as well as those who directly participate in hostilities, including those who have a 
continuous combat function. Noncombatants are not combatants. The boundaries are 
vague. What counts as direct participation in hostilities? When is one’s combat function 
continuous? These are hard questions, and I will not answer them here.  
Both international law and traditionalist just war theory assume that any combatant 
who adheres to these three principles fights permissibly, regardless of what she is fighting 
for.8 This is the ‘moral equality of combatants’, also known as the ‘symmetry thesis’ and, as 
I shall refer to it, ‘Combatant Equality’. 
 
I will discuss Proportionality and Necessity more briefly below. Discrimination and 
Combatant Equality are the most controversial tenets in the traditionalist just war theory 
canon. Walzer argued that people have fundamental rights to life and liberty, grounded in 
their moral status. Attacking people in war can be justified only if those rights are either 
overridden or somehow lost. He argued that they could be overridden only in exceptional 
                                                        
4 Compare: ‘In order to ensure respect for and protection of the noncombatant population and noncombatant 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the noncombatant population and 
combatants and between noncombatant objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.’ Article 48, first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. 
5 Compare: ‘an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of noncombatant life, injury to 
noncombatants, damage to noncombatant objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.’ Article 51(4b), first additional protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions. 
6 Compare: ‘With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:  (a) those who plan or decide 
upon an attack shall… (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a 
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of noncombatant life, injury to 
noncombatants and damage to noncombatant objects; … 3. When a choice is possible between several 
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the 
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to noncombatant lives and to noncombatant 
objects.’ From Article 57, first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. 
7 Other principles prohibit harming combatants in particular ways—for example with poisonous gas. 
8 Article 43 of the first additional protocol states explicitly that ‘combatants… have the right to participate 
directly in hostilities’. The Preamble, meanwhile, makes clear that these principles apply ‘without any 
adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or 
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.’ 
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cases of ‘supreme emergency’—if attacking noncombatants were the only way to avert Nazi 
domination of Europe, for example. In the ordinary circumstances of warfare, an act is 
permissible only if each of the victims has, ‘through some act of his own… surrendered or 
lost his rights’ [Walzer [2006b: 135]. In general, ‘a legitimate act of war is one that does not 
violate the rights of the people against whom it is directed’ [Walzer [2006b: 135].  
Walzer then argues that all and only combatants lose their rights to life and liberty 
(Walzer [2006b: 136]). First, because they threaten the lives of others, they lose their own 
rights to life (Walzer [2006b: 142]). Second, because by joining the armed forces, a 
combatant has ‘allowed himself to be made into a dangerous man’ [Walzer [2006b: 145], 
and thus surrenders his rights. Noncombatants neither threaten others, nor make 
themselves dangerous, so they retain their rights and may not be attacked. Discrimination 
follows directly. And Combatant Equality follows too: if all combatants lose their rights not 
to be killed, then a combatant fighting for an unjust cause does no wrong by killing just 
combatants. 
Walzer’s arguments for Discrimination and Combatant Equality have been refuted by 
revisionist just war theorists. Even if we accepted Walzer’s versions of Discrimination, 
Proportionality, and Necessity, Combatant Equality would still be false, since unintended 
noncombatant deaths can be justified only if the goal fought for is worth those deaths. 
Unjust combatants fighting in pursuit of an unjust cause achieve nothing that can 
counterbalance the violated rights of their victims (McMahan [1994]; Rodin [2002]; Hurka 
[2005]). When ISIL attacks Syrian and Iraqi towns, their intended goals cannot justify any 
unintended harm to noncombatants. 
This is enough to refute Combatant Equality. But Walzer’s critics went further. 
Accepting his premise that, barring supreme emergencies, intentional killing in war must 
be justified by the target’s lack of rights to life and liberty,9 they disputed his account of 
how those rights can be lost. In particular, they have shown that posing a threat is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for one to be liable to be killed (McMahan [1994]). Those who 
threaten others’ lives in self-defence, or defence of others, do not themselves forfeit their 
rights to life. The combatants of the Kurdish Peshmerga, heroically fighting to rescue 
Yazidi Christians from ISIL’s genocidal attacks, do not lose their rights against their 
Manichean adversaries. Nor are they like boxers or gladiators, who waive their rights 
against attack.  
Nor is posing a threat necessary for one to lose one’s right to life. Revisionists argue that 
what really grounds liability is responsibility for a wrongful threat. The commander-in-chief, 
for example, might be responsible for threats without posing them. The same is true for a 
terrorist leader. Combatants fighting for unjust causes are responsible for wrongful threats: 
they are liable to be killed. Just combatants are not responsible for wrongful threats: they 
are not liable. So only just combatants can kill legitimately. Combatant Equality is false.  
We must also reconsider Discrimination (McMahan [1994]; Arneson [2006]; Fabre 
[2012]; Frowe [2014]). In many states, noncombatants play an important role in the resort to 
military force. In modern industrialized countries, as much as 25 per cent of the population 
works in war-related industries (Downes [2006: 157-8], see also Gross [2010: 159]; Valentino 
et al. [2010: 351]); we provide the belligerents with crucial financial and other services; we 
support and sustain the combatants who do the fighting; we pay our taxes and in 
democracies we vote, providing the economic and political resources without which war 
would be impossible. Our contributions to the state's capacity give it the strength and 
support to concentrate on war. If the state’s war is unjust, then many noncombatants are 
responsible for contributing to wrongful threats. They are therefore permissible targets. 
This is a troubling conclusion. But if we insist that noncombatants are simply not 
                                                        
9 The views in this and the next paragraph are widely shared. Some of the most significant sources are: Rodin 
[2002]; McPherson [2004]; Arneson [2006]; McMahan [2009]; Fabre [2012]; Frowe [2014].  
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responsible enough to be liable to be killed in war, then we will probably find that many 
unjust combatants also are not responsible enough to lose their rights (McMahan [1994]). 
Whether through fear, disgust, principle, or ineptitude, many combatants are wholly 
ineffective in war, and contribute little or nothing to threats posed by their side (Marshall 
[1978]; Grossman [1995]). Many contribute no more to unjustified threats than do 
noncombatants. They also lack the ‘mens rea’ that might make liability appropriate in the 
absence of a significant causal contribution. They are simply unlucky. The loss of their 
right to life is not a fitting response to their conduct.  
If we insist that intentional killing in war is permissible only in supreme emergencies or 
when one’s targets have lost their rights to life, and if, as seems plausible, many unjust 
noncombatants and combatants are equally responsible for wrongful threats, then we face 
a dilemma. If the degree of responsibility required for liability to be killed is high, then 
noncombatants are protected in war; but so are many combatants—we would have to 
endorse a kind of near-pacifism. But if we lower the amount of responsibility required to 
lose one’s right to life, to ensure that we can fight otherwise justified wars, then we also 
license much weaker protections for noncombatants than are currently provided by 
international law. If we care at all about the fit between one’s behaviour and the fate of 
losing one’s right to life, then we must surely agree that many unjust combatants have 
done nothing that warrants their becoming liable to be killed. But if we don’t care about fit, 
then we cannot deny that, in modern states, most adults contribute in some way to their 
government’s capacity to wage unjust wars. This is the ‘responsibility dilemma’ for just war 
theory (Lazar [2010]).10 
As with Walzer’s account of the jus ad bellum, we again find that he derived plausible 
conclusions from implausible premises. But the revisionists’ counter-arguments are not 
compelling enough to warrant jettisoning traditionalist conclusions without first ensuring 
that we cannot provide them with firmer foundations.  
 
Philosophers have pursued three paths in response to this dilemma. The first camp is all-
out revisionist. Their task is to explain why killing apparently non-liable unjust combatants 
is permissible, without either undermining noncombatant immunity or re-opening the 
door to Combatant Equality. They do this by insisting that all and only unjust combatants 
are liable to be killed. Sometimes this clearly involves applying a double standard—talking 
up the responsibilities of combatants, talking down those of noncombatants (e.g. McMahan 
[2011]). But they have also advanced new arguments to this end. McMahan, for example, 
has argued that unjust combatants can be liable to be killed simply in virtue of being 
responsible for making just combatants reasonably believe that they are liable on ordinary 
grounds (McMahan [2011]). Others have abandoned Walzer’s individualist focus, and 
argued that unjust combatants are liable because they are complicit in wrongdoing, even if 
they do not causally contribute to it (Kamm [2004]; Bazargan [2013]).  
These arguments are troubling. Whether we retain or lose our rights should depend 
only on what we ourselves do. The complicity-based argument comes too close to making 
mere membership, even identity, a basis for losing one’s right to life. This is a chilling result. 
What’s more, if combatants are complicit in the wrongdoing of their comrades-in-arms, 
then surely many noncombatants are also complicit in the wrongful actions of their 
military ().  
As to McMahan’s argument: perhaps culpable responsibility for others’ false beliefs is 
relevant to permissible harm. It might be permissible for a policeman to kill a prankster 
who pretends to be a suicide bomber. But that is because he is at fault. Philosophers 
                                                        
10 Some philosophers are happier than I am to skirt close to those extremes. Frowe [2014] endorses the 
responsibility view’s troubling implications for Discrimination. And others (Rodin [2014]; May [2015]) endorse 
a form of contingent pacifism. 
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typically agree that many unjust combatants are not culpable for the injustice of their war 
(McMahan [1994]; Lazar [2010]). And blameless responsibility for others’ beliefs surely 
cannot make one a permissible target—although if it did, then that would resurrect 
Combatant Equality again, since most just combatants are also blamelessly responsible for 
unjust combatants reasonably believing that they are liable to be killed. 
 
The second approach is moderate traditionalist. It endorses a moderate form of Combatant 
Equality, according to which combatants are much more equal than the revisionists allow, 
but not exactly equivalent. In most wars, many just combatants fight impermissibly, and 
many unjust combatants fight permissibly. Still, unjust combatants whose actions 
contribute only to the advancement of their side’s unjust cause cannot fight permissibly, no 
matter how scrupulously they observe Discrimination, Proportionality, and Necessity. That 
said, they always fight less wrongfully when they observe those principles. 
The shortest route to moderate Combatant Equality starts by accepting that liability to 
be killed requires some fit between one’s behaviour and the severity of that fate. This is 
lacking for almost all noncombatants. They simply don’t do anything that can warrant 
losing their rights to life. This helps explain why killing noncombatants is so seriously 
wrong. But it also means that many unjust combatants retain their rights. The next step is 
to defend a principle I call Moral Distinction: killing noncombatants is worse than killing 
combatants. This is obviously true if the combatants are liable and the noncombatants are 
not. The challenge is to show that killing non-liable noncombatants is worse than killing 
non-liable combatants. If that is true, then it can be permissible to intentionally kill non-
liable unjust combatants in war without that entailing that non-liable unjust 
noncombatants are also permissible targets. 
Of course, even if killing combatants is better than killing noncombatants, that does not 
mean it is permissible. The third stage of the argument is to show that, since intentionally 
killing non-liable unjust combatants is not the most seriously wrongful kind of killing, it 
can be permissible even in ordinary wars. This allows us to deny pacifism, but it also lends 
support to moderate Combatant Equality. If killing non-liable combatants is not the worst 
kind of killing, then it is easier to justify the use of lethal force against just combatants by 
unjust combatants.  
We can argue for Moral Distinction by explaining either why killing non-liable unjust 
combatants is not the worst kind of killing or why killing non-liable noncombatants is 
especially seriously wrongful. On the first point, the revisionist arguments just considered 
can be mobilised here. In particular, while I deny that one can lose the right to life merely 
in virtue of membership in the armed forces, perhaps one does have a special reason to bear 
cost to avert wrongdoing by those who are part of groups of which one is also a member, 
which somewhat lowers the barrier against permissible harm.  
Additionally, many just combatants in many wars fight justly only through their good 
luck. Everything within their control could have been held constant, but they could have 
been fighting unjustly. They simply obey orders. I think that when combatants conform to 
our rights only by accident, they have weaker grounds for complaint against being harmed 
than noncombatants who more robustly respect the rights of others (Pettit [2015]). 
Further, when combatants kill other combatants, they typically believe that their cause 
is just, and that killing combatants is an acceptable means to further it. I argue elsewhere 
that killing people when you know that doing so is wrong is more seriously objectionable 
than when you reasonably believe you are acting permissibly (Lazar [2015]). Knowingly 
violating someone’s rights involves a special kind of disrespect for their moral standing. 
Lastly, although combatants do not strictly consent to be killed by their adversaries, 
they do give their opponents a limited waiver of their rights. The role of the armed forces is 
to protect their noncombatant population from the ravages of war. This means, in part, 
drawing fire away from them. They implicitly say to their adversaries: ‘you ought to cease 
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fighting entirely. But if you are going to fight, then fight us’. This is a very limited and 
conditional waiver of their rights against harm. But it does make harming those 
combatants somewhat less objectionable than harming noncombatants, who do not even 
waive their rights to this limited degree. 
Just as we can show that killing innocent combatants is not the worst kind of killing, we 
can also show that killing innocent civilians is especially objectionable (Lazar [2015]). First, 
while killing civilians can sometimes be necessary in war (Lazar [2014]), it is typically 
wholly wanton.  
Second, killing civilians typically involves an especially objectionable mode of harmful 
agency—their suffering is used as a means to compel their compatriots and leaders to end 
their war. Combatants, by contrast, are typically killed in order to avert the threat that they 
themselves pose. They are not used in the same way. Of course, at the strategic level all the 
suffering of war is used as a means to coerce the enemy leadership. But the killing takes 
place at the tactical level, where there is a robust difference between anti-civilian and anti-
combatant violence.  
Third, since civilians are so rarely liable to be killed, attacking them involves taking a 
much bigger risk of violating their rights than is the case when attacking combatants. 
Killing people in a more reckless way is worse than doing so when it is quite likely that they 
are liable. More precisely, killing an innocent person is more seriously wrongful the more 
likely it was that she was not liable to be killed (Lazar [2015]).  
Fourth, civilians are typically more vulnerable and defenceless than soldiers. The 
notion that we have special duties to protect the vulnerable, and that harming the 
defenceless is especially objectionable, are as fundamental as the idea that we ought not to 
harm the innocent. Of course, sometimes soldiers are vulnerable and defenceless, and this 
explains why harming them is sometimes harder to justify (think, for example, of the 
‘Highway of Death’, in Iraq, 1991). 
So, killing non-liable noncombatants is worse than killing non-liable combatants. We 
can sustain a deep opposition to anti-civilian violence, while allowing that killing non-
liable combatants is sometimes permissible. In particular, I think that unjust combatants 
who fight to defend their own territory, their co-citizens, and their comrades-in-arms 
sometimes fight permissibly (Kamm [2004]; Hurka [2005]; Kamm [2005]; Steinhoff [2008]; 
Lazar [2013]). This does not license them to make attacks that serve their unjust goals. But it 
does mean that Combatant Equality is closer to the truth than the revisionists believe. 
 
Some traditionalists seek a more robust vindication of Combatant Equality. Three 
institutionalist arguments are especially prominent. The first is contractualist (Benbaji 
[2008, 2011]). The existing laws of war constitute a fair and optimal agreement among states 
and their populations, which allows all to sustain disciplined armies, necessary for national 
defence and international stability. Combatants waive their rights not to be killed, in order 
to allow themselves to go to war without having to analyse the merits on every occasion.  
Although international law is clearly morally important—if you fight within 
international law, then you cannot be equated to a common murderer, even if your cause is 
unjust—I think Benbaji’s view is too narrowly statist, and cannot explain how combatants 
pursuing an unjust goal can proportionately kill non-liable noncombatants. If their ends 
are evil, they cannot justify any of the evil that they do. 
The second argument appeals to the authority of domestic law. Just as we have an 
obligation to obey the laws of our state, so combatants are obliged to obey their state’s 
orders to fight (for discussion, see Estlund [2007]; Renzo [2013]; Ryan [2016]). Again, while I 
agree that this is a genuine moral reason it is not weighty enough to license otherwise 
wrongful killing. 
The third argument grounds Combatant Equality in its long-term results, arguing that 
the existing laws of war limit the suffering caused by war (Dill and Shue [2012]; Shue [2013]; 
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Waldron [2016]). Since combatants and their leaders almost always believe their cause to 
be just, requiring unjust combatants to lay down their arms would be wholly ineffective, 
while additional permission would be abused by all sides. The existing laws of war are a 
necessary compromise with harsh reality. 
As already noted, this argument is certainly plausible, but leaves important gaps. Of 
course the laws of war should be sensitive to predictable non-compliance. But that doesn’t 
tell us what we ought to do in war. And we cannot premise that question on the assumption 
that we will predictably act impermissibly (Lazar and Valentini [2017]). We need to know 
both what the laws of war should be and what we ought to do, faced with different 
situations in war. 
 
Endorsing Moral Distinction brings us close to vindicating international law. But it does 
not take us the whole way. Discrimination prohibits intentional attacks on civilians; 
Proportionality licenses unintended but foreseen harms; Moral Distinction gives no special 
role to intentions. To justify current international law, we need to go further. Doing so 
takes us into one of the oldest debates in normative ethics, concerning the so-called 
‘doctrine of double effect’ (for useful work, see Quinn [1989]; Rickless [1997]; McIntyre 
[2001]; Delaney [2006]; Thomson [2008]; Tadros [2015]). We can defend this principle in 
two stages: first, we have to show that mental states in general can be relevant to the 
permissibility of our actions (Christopher [1998]). Many philosophers deny even this (e.g. 
Thomson [1986]; Kamm [1993]). 
Second, we need a coherent account of which mental states matter for permissibility, 
which sets intentions in context. My own view is that intentions do matter to permissibility, 
because intending to harm someone evinces greater disrespect for that person than merely 
foreseeing that one’s actions will harm him. But the difference between intended and 
merely foreseen harm is not categorical. I cannot see why we would, for example, 
absolutely prohibit intentionally violating someone’s rights, while having a relatively 
permissive stance towards merely foreseen rights-violations. The difference is one of 
degree, not of kind.  
I therefore think that the absolute prohibition on targeting civilians in international law 
is not directly grounded in our first-order moral reasons. However, here as elsewhere, hard 
cases make bad law: better to have an exceptionless principle at the heart of international 
law than reflect the moral truth, lest the latter course lead to a serious increase in wrongful 
attacks on civilians. As it is formulated in international law, Discrimination is relatively 
clear and easy to apply (notwithstanding the difficulty of determining what counts as 
directly participating in hostilities). It is not a mere rule of thumb, since it is underpinned 
by the fact that killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers, and intentional killing is 
worse than merely foreseen killing. But it takes these differences in degree, and translates 
them into a difference in kind, for the sake of minimising wrongful killing. 
Proportionality and necessity raise a number of other interesting questions, which I 
lack the space to address in depth. One issue that has been prominent in recent years is 
whether, when calculating proportionality, to discount the lives of civilians used as 
‘involuntary human shields’ by the enemy. Pro-Israeli commentators have argued that 
Hamas’ putative responsibility for using civilians as cover diminishes the Israeli Defence 
Force’s responsibility for their deaths (Walzer [2009]). And they have argued that allowing 
Hamas to abuse the IDF’s moral restraint creates perverse incentives for future conflicts 
(Keinon [2014]; for a philosophical version of the point, see Smilansky [2010]). Setting aside 
the disputed question of whether Hamas did in fact use civilians in this way, the moral 
arguments merit further consideration. My own view is that they don’t stand up.  
We ordinarily think that we should lose or forfeit our rights against harm only through 
our own actions. According to this argument, civilians’ rights are diminished in weight by 
those who use them, involuntarily, as cover. This should be cause for concern. And even if 
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Hamas were responsible for using the civilians as cover, that does not diminish the IDF’s 
responsibility for the resulting deaths—responsibility is not zero sum. Lastly, using these 
civilians as a means to deter future abuses of the IDF’s moral restraint is even more 
objectionable than harming them as a side-effect.  
With respect to necessity, the most potent recent debate has touched on similar themes. 
International law requires combatants to ‘take all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects’. This 
principle has deep moral foundations, which recent just war theory has helped bring to 
light (see especially Walzer [2006b: 155]; McMahan [2010b]; Lazar [2012b]; Luban [2014]). 
Combatants are required to bear significant costs to reduce the risk to civilians. But how 
much cost? Working that out means attending to all the arguments for Moral Distinction, 
but also to soldiers’ special role-obligations to protect noncombatants, as well as their 
duties to protect one another.  
5. Conclusion 
The last two decades have been turbulent for just war theory. For the first time, it has 
received the kind of sustained philosophical analysis that other areas of moral and political 
philosophy have enjoyed for much longer. The first fruits of that analysis were revisionist, 
throwing the hard-won consensus at the heart of international law and practice into 
question. But as the debate has evolved, the more radical revisionist conclusions have been 
shown to depend mostly on a limited conceptual palette and a restricted philosophical 
imagination. Grounding our account of the ethics of war in our intuitions about small-scale 
cases of self-defence is like grounding our theory of distributive justice in the principles 
appropriate to shipwrecked castaways dividing up cowrie shells on a desert island. 
Undoubtedly we can learn something about the morality of war from those highly 
simplified interpersonal cases. But we must also think about war itself. Once we expand 
our focus, we quickly find that the core of the law of armed conflict—its commitments 
concerning national defence, legitimate authority, proportionality and necessity ad bellum 
and in bello, and discrimination—may not precisely mirror our more fundamental moral 
reasons, but nor is it the morally rootless product of power and compromise.11 
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